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THE FICTITIOUS PAYEE
T is proposed to discuss the doctrine that negotiable instruments
with fictitious payees are deemed payable to bearer, and to note
the conditions and limitations of the rule.
The scope of the article, then, will be confined within a rather
narrow compass and right at the outset it may be helpful to gain
some conception of the meaning of the word "fictitious." In a ma-
jority of the cases no attempt has been made to define the term. It
would seem, however, that ascertaining the legal meaning must be
a simple task, and yet it has presented some difficulty.
In the case of Vinden v. Hughes, [19o5] I K. B. 795, the court
defined "fictitious" as "feigned or pretended ;" and again, in North
and South Wales Bank v. Macbeth, [19o8] A. C. iO7, Lord Rob-
ertson accepts the words "feigned, imaginary" as expressing "fic-
titious." The most common example, perhaps, is the use of the
name of a person not living, with knowledge of that person's non-
existence." Suppose then the maker selects the name of John
Brown, having in mind a person who died ten years ago. Is this
a fictitious payee in view of the fact that there are many John
Browns living? Is the term "fictitious" synonymous with "non-
existing?" In the early case of Bennett v. Farnell, (18o7) I Camp.
129, Lord Ellenborough used the term "fictitious" in the sense of
"non-existing" in that the person named had died a long time ago.
In both the English Bills of Exchange Act and the American Uni-
form Negotiable Instruments Law, the words "fictitious or non-
existing" are found. An explanation of these terms is offered
by Juldge Bowen in the leading case of Bank of England v. Vagliano
Brothers, 23 Q. B. D. 26o, when he says the word "non-existing"
is superfluous but probably was introduced in the sub-section with
reference to the case of Asphital v. Bryan, 33 L. J. Q. R. 320, where
the payee's name was that of a deceased person.' But in Clutton &
Company v. Attenborough, 2 Q. B. 3o6, 7o7; [1897] A. C. I9O, the
court emphasized the fact that the payee was a "non-existing" per-
son. Lord Halsbury says:
"Whatever might have been said in Vagliano's case [1891]
I Or using the name of a dissolved partnership. Cat'itt v. fames & Co. (1873), 39
Tex. x89, z98: or of a firm wfiich never existed. Ort v. Fonler (2884), 31 Kan. 478,47 Am.
Rep. Sot; or of a pretended corporation without a de facto existence. Farnsworth v.
Drake (x858), xx Ind. ioz.
2This eiplanation was accepted by M. D. Chalmers in 7 LAw QuA3. REV. 21g; also
CnALuxis Bi.LS OF EXCHANGE (6 ed.) (1903) p. 22.
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A. C. io7, where there were questions raising a doubt upon
the applicability of those words, or whatever might be said
about the difference between the words 'fictiticus' and 'non-
existing,' it has in this case never been suggested that on the
face of these instruments the name of George Brett is any-
thing other than the name of a non-existing person."
In North and South Wales Bank v. Macbeth, [i9o8] I K. B. 20,
Lord Alverstone, speaking for the Court of Appeals, in commenting
on the case of Clutton & Company v. Attenborough said:
"The judgmentsin that case proceeded throughout upon
the basis that Brett, the payee of the cheque, was a non-
existing person. The summary of the facts states, 'There
was no such person as George Brett.' That statement does
not mean, of course, that there was no person whose name
was George Brett. I myself am aware of the fact that
there are persons bearing that name, one of whom I know.
The statement means that the case was argued upon the ba-
sis of George Brett being a non-existing person."
In that same case Lord Buckley has this to say in attempting to
sustain the position that there is a difference between "fictitious"
and "non-existing:"
"Two different effects are contemplated by that sub-sec-
tion (7-3), the one is, that the payee is fictitious; the other
that he is non-existent. Existence or non-existence of a
particular person is a question of fact, not relevant to any-
body's mind or intention. 'Fictitious' is different. A thing
can only be fictitious relatively to some one. There can be
no action without an actor, and no fiction without a feigner.
Fiction is necessarily relative."
With due deference to the learned judges who have attempted
thus to distinguish between "fictitious" and "non-existing" it seems
that the real difference between the terms is, that, while every
non-existing payee must necessarily be fictitious, the converse is
not true. In other words, the term "fictitious" is the broader, in-
cluding within it that which is "non-existing." Especially is this
true as there is still another sense in which the term "fictitious" has
been employed. Where the name of a living person, known to the
drawer or maker, is chosen, but that person has no interest in the
instrument, and it is intended that he shall have none, such a desig-
nation is held to constitute a fictitious payee. Illustrations are to
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be found in both the English law" and in that of the United States.4
But before proceeding further, it may be well to eliminate some
things that do not constitute fictitious payees and are not to be con-
founded with this doctrine.
First. Suppose the bill of exchange, note or check is payable
"to the order of the Estate of, D. G. Littlefield." In the case of
Lewisohn v. The Kent and Stanley Company (1895) 87 Hun 257
(N. Y.), the court in a poorly reasoned case held the instrumerit to
be a promissory note payable to a fictitious payee, and, having been
negotiated by the maker, was payable to bearer.5 Incidentally it
may be noted that some courts have gone to the other extreme,
treating such instruments as bad altogether for want of certainty
of a payee, and regarding them merely evidence of a debt due the
estate0 It is submitted, however, that such instruments should be
regarded as payable to the personal representative of the estate
named, that being obviously the intention.?
Second. There is the impersonal payee, as distinguished from
the fictitious payee, for example, "cash" or "bills payable," not pur-
porting to be the name of any person. This class of case offers no
difficulty, the instrument being uniformly, both under the law mer-
chant and the code, treated as payable to bearer.8
Third. Where, by mistake, the payee is wrongly designated, and
the maker, erroneously supposing that William Jones' name is
William Smith, inserted the latter name. Such an instrument, both
under the law merchant and the Negotiable Instruments Law, is not
payable to a fictitious person but to William Jones, who can trans-
fer the instrument by signing either name."
Fourth. Leaving a blank for the name of the payee, and thereby
giving an implied authority to fill in a payee's name.10 Under the
law merchant in the United States the great majority of
cases held that the taker could rely upon the apparent authority
' Bank of EngIand v. Vagliano Brothers [z1g], A. C. o7.
4Meacher v. Fort (1837). A Hill (S. C.) 227. 30 Am. Dec. 364.
s See also Scott v. Parker (2889), S N. Y. S. 753.
4Henricks v. Thornton, 4S Ala. 309; Tittle v. Thomas (z8Ss), 3oMiss. 722, 64 Am.
Dec. 154; Lynn v. Marshall, it Barb. 241. C. BowIes v. Lambert (2870), S4 Ill. 237.
'Shaw v. Smith (1889), iso Mass. z66, 6 L R. A. 348; Peltier v. Babillion (z8i8),
4S Mich. 384 (Semble). CxAJwFozD's ANqxOTATIM NEGoTsAB.z INSTRUMENTS LAw (19x6).
P- 33.
a C... 1292; 22 L. R. A. N. S. 507 note.
* Chenot Y. Lefevre (1846), 8 MII. 637; Charitable Association in the Middle Parish
in Granzoille v. Baldwin (84o, 1 Mete. (Mass.) 3S9 Negotiable Instruments Law (Com-
mimioners Draft) 43.
to Rich v. Starbuck (187S), S Ind. 87; Johnston Harvester Co. V. McLean (883), 57
YRs. 2S8. 46 Am. Rep. 39.
THE FICTITIOUS PAYZE
given by the maker or drawer to the first holder, ah authority which
he could delegate to-subsequent takers."' But unaer the Negotiable
Instruments Law this has probably been changed, making the law
in this respect now conform to the English view, which puts the
taker on his guard to ascertain whether the authority to fill in was
properly exercised, whenever he has notice that a blank existed in
the instrument when it left the hands of the maker or 
drawer. 12
This is not to be confused with the case where no blank space is
left, for example, in the case of Mclntosh v. Lytle, (i880) 26 Minn.
336, the instrument was payable to the order of "On sight," and
the court said:
"The drawer undoubtedly meant to draw a check, but hav-
ing left out the payee's name without inserting in lieu there-
of words indicating the bearer as payee, it is as fatally de-
fective as it would be if the drawee's name were omitted."
It is evident the words used indicated the time of payment and
did not manifest an intention to designate an impersonal payee.
Nor is the case of the impersonal payee to be confounded with one
where a line is drawn through the blank space, sdch an instru-
ment being likewise non-negotiable for want of a payee.
1
3 The doc-
trine of South Carolina, that an instrument payable "to order" only
without designating a payee shall be deemed payable to a fictitious
person, and can be sued on by a bona fide holder as bearer seems
dearly erroneous."'
Fifth. Still another kind of case occurs, where it is payable to the
order of a certain person who has just died, but of whose death the
maker or drawer is ignorant. The payee is in fact non-existing,
but the case should be classified with: "order paper," that is to
say, it should be treated as payable to the order of the personal rep-
resentatives, and not as payable to bearer. CHALMRS, BirLs ov
EXCHANGX (6 ed.) 19o3, p. 24, in discussing the English Act sa) s:
"Before the Act, it was held that where a bill was drawn
payable to a deceased person in ignorance of his death, his
personal representative might enforce the bill and there is
nothing in the Act to derogate from this ruling."
It is to be observed, however, that the case which he cites. Mur-
U Chemung Cana
t 
Bank v. Bradner (1871), 44 N. Y. 680; Wilson v. Kinsey (1874). 49
Ind. 3S.
2NoxTox, BILLS AND NoTEs (4 ed.) p. 346; BuNxAN, THz NECOTrmALr INsrRUmzETS
LAw AmNorArs (2 ed.), p. ig.
3Gordon v. Lansing State Savings Bawk (1903), 133 MicIb. 143.
"Davega v. Moore, 3 McCord 482, r4 S. C. L. 483. Cf. Fretwell v. Carter (1907).
78 S. C. 531.
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ray v. East hndia Company, (1821) 5 B. and Ald. 204, is not square-
ly in point because it involves a special indorsement to a person after
his decease. But the same principle should apply to the case of the
payee.
Sixth. It is also important to exclude the case of the impostor.
who fraudulently induces the maker or drawer to deliver an instru-
ment to him made payable to the name of the person whom the im-
postor is impersonating. A holder in due course is permitted to re-
cover, either because the maker or drawer must be considered as
having intended the instrument to be paid to the impostor, or to his
indorsement, or because there is an estoppel to deny he was the
real payee.1 5 It is different, however, if the impostor represents
himself as the agent of some other person, to whose order the in-
strument is made payable. Not even an innocent purchaser can re-
cover in this country against the maker, drawer or acceptor on such
an instrument, as a valid indorsement of the person named as payee
is necessary.16
Seventh. A distinction 1- to be noted between the doctrine of the
fictitious payee and the case of the maker or drawer who uses a
fictitious name as his own business name. It is well settled that a
man may use any name he pleases as a business name. Such paper
is rightly treated as payable to his order, and may be indorsed, eith-
er in his own name, or in the assumed name." The argument has
been advanced that this principle be applied to all fictitious payees,
with the result that the doctrine as it now exists, would be done
away, and all such paper would be deemed payable to the order of
the maker or drawer under the fictitious name, and his indorsement
would be necessary to pass a good title.
18  This theory would be
unobjectionable if it in fact expressed the intention of the party
inserting, or causing the fictitious name to be inserted, but where
the name is that of a real person which is used to deceive others,
to say that the forger was thus designating himself, and when he
indorsed, he wrote simply his own name, is certainly not express-
ing the drawer's real intention.'
9 Further than that, even if it were
conceded that the law should be simplified by doing away with the
doctrine altogether, it would seem from a practical viewpoint to be
is E poria Nat. Bank v. Shotwell (z886), 35 Kan. 36o, 57 Am. Rep. 171.
I 5o L. R. A. 75, note.
17Bryant v. Eastman (1851). 7 Cush. II (Mass.); Forbes v. Espey (z871), 21 Oh.
St. 474; Edgerton v. Preston. 15 Ill. A. 23; Jones v. Home Furnishing Co. (1896), 41 N.
Y. S. 71; Negotiable Instruments Law (Commissioners Draft) I A8.
Is HARV. L. REV. 494: 29 HARV. L. REv. 2z6; BRANNAN, THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
LAW A.NNOTAtFD (2 ed.). p. 166. 227.
1
9 See 3 ILL. L. Rv. 31.
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highly improbable that concerted action to that effect-could be ob-
tained after more than one hundred and twenty-five years of uni-
versal acceptance thereof in some form. The failure to distinguish
between the fictitious payee and the case where another name is
really assumed as a business name is likely to lead to confusion and
to carry with it serious consequences, so far as the rights of parties
to such instruments are concerned. It must be admitted that it is
by no means an easy task to determine just at what point John
Smith will be said to have assumed the name of William Jones,
where his motive was to defraud someone. The New York courts
have had occasion to deal with this question several times in re-
cent years, and there is a dissenting opinion in three out of four
cases. The conclusion, if any can safely be drawn from the cases,
seems to be that the intention to assume another name must have
been manifested by overt acts outside of and in addition to the one
which gave rise to the litigation.20
We may ask ourselves why any one would wish to make an in-
strument payable to a fictitious person. Two motives suggest
themselves: first, in order to defraud some one by inducing another
to part with his money on the strength of the supposed credit of the
payee, particularly where the payee is the name of some person
known to the other party ;21 second, to assume another name in
which to conduct the business. But this last-kind of case, as here-
tofore explained, ceases to be a fictitious payee in the sense in which
it is used in negotiable paper.
As the doctrine of the fictitious payee came into being in Eng-
land it may not be amiss briefly to trace its history. It had its ori-
gin in a series of cases that aroie out of bills drawn by Livesey &
Co., bankrupts.2 2  In the Tatlock case, which was the first to be
decided, the court held at the time the bill was drawn, there were
no such persons in existence as Grigson & Co., a fact notorious to
all the parties in the transaction; further, though the names of
" See United Cigar Stores Co. v. American Raw Silk Co. (1918), 171 N. Y. S. 480;
Hartford v. Greenwich Bank (1913). 142 N. Y. S. .187. affd. 21s N. Y. 726. Holub.
Dusha Co. v. Gcrmania Bank (1914), 149 N. Y. S. 77S. The majority of the court seem
to have misconstrued the facts, the dissenting opinion appears to be the better. P. &
G. Card & Paper Co. v. Fifth Nat. Bank (1918). 172 N. Y. S. 688.
11 Macbeth v. North and South Wales Bank [xgo6l. a K. B. 718, Bray, J.; "I
think the word 'fictitious' implies the name has been inserted by the person who has
put it in for the same dishonest purpose, without any intention that the cheque should
be paid to that person only."
= Tatlock v. Harris (x789). 3 Term R. 174. Vere v. Lewis, 3 Term R. 182 (same
day and without argument); Collis v. Emctt. I H. BI. 313: Minet v. Gibson (1789),
3 Term R. 481; Bennett v. Farnell (1807), s Camp. 129, 18o c.
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Grigson & Co., might not be known to the holder, yet since he took
it on the credit of those whose names appeared upon it to either of
whom he might resort for payment, he could recover from the ac-
ceptor on the count for money paid and money had and received.
Campbell, in 3 Term R. 133, commenting on this case said the re-
covery was "upon the idea that there was an appropriation of so
much money to be paid to the person who should become the hold-
er of the bill;" said holder being the "bona fide holder for a valu-
able consideration." In the subsequent cases the recovery was al-
lowed on the count that the instrument was payable to bearer.
The first case to reach the House of Lords was Minet v. Gibson in
i79i, I H. B1. 569, and has since generally been referred to as the
leading case, although it contains a strong dissenting opinion. In
the case of Bennett v. Farnell, 18O7, 1 Camp. 129, the reporter at
first stated the decision erroneously, but corrected it at page i8o c,
where he quotes Lord Ellenborough as follows:
"If it had appeared that defendant knew George Abney,
the payee, to be a fictitious payee (George Abney being the
name of a deceased brother of the drawer) he should have
directed the jury to find for the plaintiff."
In other words, it is clear from these cases that in order to make
the instrument payable to bearer as against the acceptor, knowl-
edge on his part was necessary, and the holder must have taken
for value, in ignorance of the fact, that the instrument was pay-
able to a fictitious person.
23
In 1882 the English Bills of Exchange Act was adopted. Sec-
tion 7 (3) provides, "where the payee is a fictitious or non-existing
person the bill may be treated as payable to bearer." The English
courts have had considerable trouble in determining the law under
this provision, and have considered the matter in four notable
cases, to-wit: Bank of England v. Vagliano Brothers, [i89i ] A. C.
107; Clutton & Company v. Attenborough, [1897] A. C.
9o; Vinden v. Hughes, [9o5] I K. B. 795 ; North and South Wales
Bank v. Macbeth, [i9o81 A. C. 107. In the first case the acceptor
sued the bank at which the bills were payable to recover the money
paid out by the bank, and charged to the acceptor. The House of
Lords, by a divided court, finally held that the acceptor need have
no knowledge of the fictitious character of the payee, thereby chang-
ing the law merchant.24  In the Clutton case the court in substance
2 See SToRY. BILLS OF EXCHANGE (84.3). 1 6 and 7 200.
24 Chalmers in 7 LAw QujT. RaV. 216 has this comment to make: "the case affords a
good illustration of the uncertainty of law, and of the kaleidoscopic nature of the ju.
dicial mind. Although the plaintiff lost the day, he may still derive a melancholy sat-
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held that the payee be deemed fictitious, because the drawer did
not have a particular person in mind at the time, although he sup-
posed the payee was a real person; while in the last two cases the
payees named were known by the drawers to be customers, to whom
the drawers supposed themselves to be indebted, because of the
fraudulent representations of their clerks, with the result that the
bills were not regarded -as payable to fictitious payees.
2"
This brings us, then, to a consideration of the code, the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law, which has been adopted in every state
of the United States, except Georgia, and which is also law in Alas-
ka and Hawaii. Section 9 (3) of the Commissioners Draft, pro-
vides that a negotiable instrument shall be payable to bearer "when
it is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing person and
such fact was known to the person making it so payable."
It is commonly stated that this section is a codification of the law
merchant,2 6 except that the indorsement of the fictitious name is no
longer necessary 27 and this is no doubt very largely true, though it
is a rather broad statement to make in view of the fact that the ques-
tions which arise from a failure expressly to eliminate them, have
not been adjudicated in a majority of the states. The requirement
that the maker or drawer must have known of the fictitious charac-
ter of the payee was quite generally accepted as part of the law
merchant,28 except in Kansas.2 9  The Kansas doctrine, prior to the
adoption of the code in that state, made a distinction between the
case, where the maker had a particular person in mind, whom he
named as payee, and where he thought the fictitious payee was a real
person, but did not know any one by that name, treating the instru-
ment in the latter case as payable to bearer.
2 0 It may be observed in
isfaction from the knowledge that eight judges out of fifteen have given opinions in his
favour, and that the seven who were adverse to him by no means agreed as to the
grounds on which his claim should be defeated."
u Town and County Advance Co. v. Provincial Bank of Ireland [1917], 2 Ir. R.
421. accord.
N x6 COLMBIA L. REV. 428: 64 PExNsyLvANrA L. REv. 96.
SNORTON, BiLLs A n NoTES (4 ed.), p. 89; BRENAN, THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
LAw ANNOTATED (a ed.). p. ,3.
"Armstrong v. Pameray National Bank (889). 46 Oh. St. 512, Is Am. St. R. 655,
6 L. R. A. 6a5,
'Kohn v. Watkin.r (z882). 26 Ran. 691, 40 Am. Rep. 336; Ort v. Fowler (z884).
32 Kan. 478, 47 Am. Rep. 5oi.
-*DArEL. NEGOTIABLE ISTRUMENTS (6 ed.). z.g. seems to have been the only
American text-writer who took this view, and it is to be noted that the only cases he
cites in support are Kohn v. Watkins, supra, which in arriving at its conclusions quoted
from an earlier edition of Daniel: and Lane v. Krekle, 22 Ia. 404, where it is at most
only a dictum, as the instrument was expressly made payable to bearer
303.
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passing, that the English court, in construing Section 7 (3) of its
code has accepted the Kansas position by making knowledge on the
part of the maker immaterial.' It is, of course, to be remembered
that the English Act makes no reference to the makers knowledg
of the fictitious character of the payee. This change in the English
law seems to be without justification, because if it is right to protect
the maker or drawer where a fraudulent party induces him to make
the instrument payable to a real person, whom the maker has in
mind at the time, there appears to be no good reason why the same
protection should not be afforded him where the payee is in fact fic-
titious, though the maker honestly thinks the name is that of a real
person, whom he intends shall indorse.
Although under the express words of the Negotiable Instruments
Law, the necessity of knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer
seems obvious, the American courts have had to pass on the ques-
tion a number of times. The leading case is that of Seaboard Nat.
Bank v. Batk of America, (19o8) 193 N. Y. 26. The fraudulent
party induced the drawer to make the bill payable to real persons,
whom the drawer supposed were to have an interest in the instru-
ment. The swindler then forged the payees' names and received
the money. The court in deciding that the bills were not payable
to bearer said:
"The secret intention of a criminal contrary to his express
intention and the avowed purpose for which he obtains pos-
session of a draft, does not give the criminal ownership of the
draft or a legal right to change a draft payable to a real per-
son, to one payable to bearer."
The inteniion to make the instrument payable to a fictitious person
"must exist as an affirmative fact in the mind of the drawer of a
draft at the time of its delivery."
Some courts seem to have experienced difficulty in knowing
when, if ever, the knowledge of the fictitious character of the payee
is to be imputed to the drawer or maker. In Equitable Life Assur.
Soc. v. National Bank of Commerce, (1916) 181 S. W. 1176 (Mo.),
the agent of the plaintiff insurance company conspired with others
in procuring a policy on the life of a fictitious person, the loss be-
ing payable to a fictitious beneficiary, and shortly thereafter sent
in proofs of death, causing the company to issue a check payable to
U Cluton & Company v. Attelnborough [t897] A. C. go.
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the fictitious beneficiary. The agent delivered the check to a fellow
conspirator, the payee's name wai indorsed by one of them and
cashed. The court held the instrument was payable to bearer, on
the ground that knowledge of the agent is to be imputed to the
principal. This decision is unsound on principle, inasmuch as the
agent was here acting adversely to his principal, and was not the-
representative of the company in the drawing of the check.
32 Op-
posed to the Missouri case and representing the correct view is the
recent decision of Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Home Savings Bank,
(i919) 182 Pac. 293, where the court said:
"The point in this case is that the checks were not exe-
cuted by the guilty agent; we are not concerned with an act
done by him within the scope of his authority, and therefore
his guilty intent and knowledge are not the intent anti
knowledge of his principal. The intent and knowledge of
the principal was, as we have said, that of the officers who
drew the checks, and they were wholly innocent of any in-
tention of drawing checks to fictitious payees."
3
But where the dishonest agent has authority to draw checks
and signs the principal's name New York and Pennsylvania have
held that the principal is to be charged with the knowledge of the
agent in selecting a fictitious payee.
8' These cases, while closer to
the line, as the agent was acting adversely to the principal's interest,
are probably right in their application of the law of principal and
agent. A different rule prevails where the wrongful agent is a gov-
ernment official, having authority under the treasury rules to draw
instruments payable to the order of real persons only, because,
if in such a case ne draws it payable to a fictitious person and in-
dorses the payee's name, the depository bank will be charged with
notice that the agent's authority is limited.
5 But this rule did not
prevail in United States v. Chare Nat. Bank, (1917) 24t Ved. 535,
where a sergeant forg d the name of an army officer, who was au-
thorized to draw on the treasury department, made the bill payable
3M3MzmCE AoGEc2, (2 ed.), I x8ts. ,822. 182S.
- Grand Lodge of Kansas v. Emporia Nat. Bank (1917), X01 Kan. 369, -accord.
"Phillips v. Mercant le Nat. Bak (894), 140 N. Y. 56, 23 L. 2. A. S84, 
37 Am.
St. Rep. s96; Snyder v. Cmar Exchange Bank, (9o8), 221 Pa. 599, 129 
Am. St. Rep.
780. Cf. P & G Card & Paper Co. v. Fifth Nat. Bank (1918). 1* N. Y. S. 688. And 
see
Bartlett V. First Nat. Bank (2910), 247 I1L- 490.
N NatInal Bank of Commerce v. United States (zgxS), a24 Fed. 679. See corn.
wnt on case in 64 P IMNZYLVAITA L R". 96, and in 29 HAtv. L. RZY. *6.
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to the order of that officer, then forged the payee's name, and
cashed it. The court held that the United States could not recover
the money which the treasury department had paid to the defend-
ant bank. This case is very unsatisfactory, for after arguing that
the indorsement by the forger was inmmaterial, as the whole instru-
ment was "a forgery and created no obligation," the court iefused
to permit the government to get back its money. It is not within
the rule of the well known English case of Cooper v. Meyer, (183o)
io B. & C. 468. There the drawer's and the payee's name was the
same, and the holder was permitted to recover from the acceptor
by proving that the handwriting of the drawer's name was identical
with that of the payee in the indorsement, for in that case the
drawer-payee was not a real person and the result reached was con-
sidered a carrying out the acceptor's intention; while in United
States v. Chase Nat. Bank the drawer-payee was an agent of the
drawee with authority to draw. The case is within the rule of Bee-
mnan v. Duck, (1843) 11 M. & W. 251. The government should have
recovered the amount of the bill. Such a decision places the gov-
ernment in a worse position where a stranger forges the name of
the drawer and the payee than where an agent with authority to
draw makes the instrument payable to a fictitious person.
Section 9 (3) of the Negotiable Instruments Law appears to be
seriously defective in that it leaves to judicial interpretation and
construction four questions that could easily have been eliminated
by express words. They are these:
I. In order that the instrument be deemed payable to
bearer, is it necessary that the taker be a purchaser before
maturity and without knowledge of the fictitious character
of the payee, that is, must he be a holder in due course or
claim through one?
II. In what sense are the words "fictitious or non-exist-
ing" used? Do they cover the case of a real person not hav-
ing and not intended to have any interest in the instrumcnt?
III. Is knowledge on the part of the drawee of the fic-
titious character of the payee necessary at the time of ac-
ceptance or payment?
IV. Is an indorsement of the fictitious name necessary?
The silence of the Negotiable Instruments Law on these points
is unfortunate, because it is absolutely misleading to the laity,
while it raises doubts in the mind of the professional man, which
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naturally impairs its value in that it makes necessary a search of
the authorities." But it is too late now to bewail the fact that the
Act is not perfect in these respects, because it has proven very diffi-
cult in the past to have changes adopted even when pointed out be-
fore that state adopted the Act. We have, therefore, a condition
to face not likely or easily remedied by future legislation.
The solution of these questions we are told is a matter of inter-
pretation and construction for the courts. How then should sec-
tion 9 (3) be construed? Is it possible to devise any rule that 'Will
be a safe guide? In Bank of England v. Vagliano Brothers, 23 Q.
B. D. 243, the Court of Appeals held the Bills of Exchange Act was
a codifying Act, and must be interpreted with reference to the law
it was intended to embody. On appeal to the House of Lords,
[1891] A. C. iO7, Lord Herschell took issue with this view by
saying:
"The proper course is in the first instance to examine
the language of the statute and to ask what is its natural
meaning, uninfluenced by any considerations derived from
the previous state of the law, and not to start with inquiring
how the law previously stood, and then, assuming that it
was probably intended to leave it unaltered, to see if the
words of the enactment will bear an interpretation in con-
formity with this view. The purpose of such a statute sure-
ly was that in any point specifically dealt with by it, the law
should be as ascertained by interpreting the language used,
instead of, as before, by roaming over a vast number of au-
thorities in order to discover what the law was, extracting it
by a minute critical examination of the prior decisions."
These generalizations, it is submitted, are not very helpful. Lord
Herschell seems to lay all the emphasis on interpretation, that is
in ascertaining the meaning of the words used and almost ignores
the broader question of construction. Interpretation no doubt
2 It might also be -argued that these imperfections will lead to conflicting decisions
in different jurisdictions, and to that extent will defeat the very purpose for which 
the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law was passed, uniform decisions as well 
as a uni-
form statute being obviously necessary to reach the goal of a uniform law. 
The possi-
bility of conflicting decisions on points not expressly covered is all the greater because
of the attitude of the bench and the bar in ignoring oftentimes the decisions of other
states on the same section. and instead thereof citinr the cases in that state 
prior to the
act. See article by Amasa M. Eaton in 12 M .ci. L. Rzv. 89, "On Uniformity 
in Ju-
dicial Decisions of Cases Arising under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act."
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should be conclusive "on any point specifically dealt with," but the
difficulty in most instances is to determine when that has been
done. Judge Chitty in the English case of In re Budgett; Cooper
v. Adams, [1894] 2 Ch. Div. 557, 561, involving the English Bank-
ruptcy Act made this comment:
"These observations (of Lord Herschell) do not in my
opinion apply to the bankruptcy Act of 1883. The substance
of what fell from the Lord Chancellor is, that, where there
is an Act such as the Bills of Exchange Act, codifying the
law, the proper rule of interpretation is to read the Act and
to interpret its provisions without reference to previous
decisions or to previous legislation, that being a prima facie
rule only to which there would be reasonable exceptions. As
the Chancellor said, [i89i] A. C. 145, 'I am, of course, far
from asserting that resort may never be had to the previous
state of the law for the purpose of aiding in the construction
of the provisions of the code.'"
The upshot of the whole matter seems to be that insofar as the
Act fails expressly to cover the questions involved, a problem of
construction is presented, as to which no general rule can be de-
vised. It is not only wise but right that the court cqnsider the law
as it was prior to the Act. Indeed the Bills of Exchange Act,
section 97 (2), expressly provides: "The rules of the common
faw, including the law merchant, save so far as they are inconsis-
tent with the express provismps of this Act, shall continue to apply
to bills of exchange, promissory notes and cheques." And the Ne-
gotiable Instruments Law, section 196- (Commissioners Draft)
says: "In any case not provided for in this Act the rules of the
law merchant shall govern." The writer is inclined to agree with
Professor -I-ening when he says:
"The body of precedents of the common law and of the
law merchant are a safety appliance. They give the judge
examining them a liberal education in the subject before he
decides the case before him. '3'
This application of former law may at times be tantamount to
judicial legislation, but if intelligently done helps to correct the
shortcomings of the legislature in turning out an incomplete act.
" 59 PEN SYLVANIA L. REv. 482.
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Let us now address ourselves to the questions heretofore pro-
pounded.
I. Must the taker under the Negotiable Instruments Law be a
holder in due course or claim through one before the instrument
will be deemed payable to bearer? Neither the American nor the
English Act, as drawn, expressly make it a condition. Under the
law merchant both in England and in this country, it was well set-
tled, however, that the holder could not recover if he had knowl-
edge of the fictitious character of the payee, the basis of the doc-
trine being estoppel on the part of the drawer or maker for know-
ingly designating a fictitious payee. 38  In DANIEL ON NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS, (6 ed.) 136 the reason is very forcibly given in
these words:
"The law abhors fraud and discountenances the instru-
ments by which it may be committed. For this reason bills
and notes payable to fictitious payees are not tolerated, and
will never be enforced save when in the hands of a bona fide
holder, who received them without knowledge of their true
character. The appearance of a name upon the paper as
a payee and indorser is naturally calculated and has been
often used as a means to give it fictitious credit whereby in-
nocent parties are beguiled into purchasing it."
He says further if the holder has notice then the instrument .is
said to be void, "it being the policy of the law to interdict tle circu-
lation of such deceptive instrum-ents."' 9 -Lord Herschell in Bank
of England v. Vagliana Brothers, [1891] A. C. io7 at 154, says:
"By whom may they be so treated? By a bona fide purchas-
er for value, certainly * * * I, of course, exclude the
S'SToay, Bis.S r EXCHANGE (843), q'6 and 2oo Hunter v. feffery, 2 Peake
N. P. x46: Benntt v. Farnell I Camp IL1. zio zSo; NORTON, BILLs A"N NoTEs (4 ed.),
p. 88.
*But where no fraud is involved there is some authority for holding that one
with knowledge can recover. For example, D makes a note payable to X bank intend-
ing to get it discounted there, but on the bank's refusal P buys it, the instrument never
having been delivered to the bank nor indorsed by it. Two states have held that P may
regard the instrument as payable to a fictitious person and sue as bearer. Elliott v.
Abbot (184 ), 12 N. H. 549, 37 Am. Dec. 27; In re Pendleton Hardware Co. (1893),
24 Oreg. 330. Most courts, however, do not treat the instrument as payable to bear-
er. but, instead of insisting that P shall sue in quasi-contract, they rather anomalously
permit him to sue on the instrument either in the payee's name with or without that
person's consent, or in his own name as the person intended or where code pleading pre-
vails as the real party in interest. AME' CAS oE BILLs Amn NoTEs, I, p. 135; 8 C. 3-
333.
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case of one who is a party to or who has notice of a fraud."
Thus the English court quite properly read into its Act that part
of the law merchant and settled the question there. In this coun-
ry, while there is very little authority directly in point subsequent
to the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law, there is no rea-
son, on principle, why the same result should not be reached.40
II. Do the words "fictitious or non-existing" as used in the Bills
of Exchange Act and the Negotiable Instruments Law, include the
case of a real person not having any right to or interest in the instru-
ment, and who was not intended by the party inserting the name
to have any? Illinois, seeing this omission in the Commissioners
Draft, expressly covered the point by inserting in their Act after
the words "fictitious or non-existent" the following: "or of a living
person not intended to have any interest in it."1 Other states, how-
ever, have not done so, nor does the English Act eliminate the
question. Turning again to the law merchant, we find that most
courts hold such a payee shall be deemed fictitious. In Coggill v.
American Ex. Bank, (1847) I N. Y. 113, 49' Am. Dec. 310, the
court said, "as the payee had no interest and it was not intended
that he should ever become a party to the transaction, he may be re-
garded, in relation to this matter, as a nonentity," making the instru-
ment payable to bearer. This view is clearly correct 42  It is not
surprising, then, to see that under the Act those courts that have
had to deal with the problem have accepted this conception of fic-
titious as part of the code itself. s And it is to be hoped that like
decisions wilf-be made in jurisdictions where the question has not
yet been presented.
III. Is knowledge on the part of the drawee of the fictitious
character of the payee necessary at the time of the acceptance or
payment before the bill becomes payable to bearer as to him? Un-
der the law merchant, as already pointed out, knowledge was, from
earliest times, deemed necessary, as otherwise, it was thought, no
" Union Trust Co. v. Adams (x93). s4 Ind. A. x66. In Trust Co. of America v.
Hamilton Bank (r9o8), tr2 N. Y. S. 84. the court several times emphasized the fact
that the taker was a holder in due course.
4"Jones and Addington. IL Stat. Anno. 1 7648 (3).
" Dana v. Underwood (1837), 19 Pick. (Mass.) 99, contra.
"s 22 L. R. A. N. S. go6, note; Shipman v. Bank of the State of N. Y. (x8g), 126
N. Y. 318. X2 L. R. A. 791, 22 Am. St. Rep. 82r: Trust Company of America v. Ham-
ilton Bank (9o8), 112 N. Y. S. 84. Seaboard Nat. Bank v Bank of America (19o8),
i3 N. Y. 26; Bartlett v. Firit Nat. Bank (1910), 247 I1. 490. Holub-Dusha Co v.
Germania Bank (1914). 149 N. Y. S. 77S. Cf. Jordan Marsh Co. v. National Shawmut
Bank (1909), 201 Mass. 397, 22 L. I. A. X. S. a5o.
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estoppel could be raised against him" In Bank of England v.
Vagliano Brothers, [1891] A. C. io7, the court ultimately held that
the omission in the English Act was intentional, and that knowledge
was no longer necessary. The strongest.argument to be advanced
by the majority Lords was, that knowledge is, on principle, unnec-
essary because the acceptor has nothing to do with the selection of
the payee, his only concern being to carry out the order of the
drawer, so as to be able to charge him
45 In this country there are
only two states under the Negotiable Instruments Law that have
passed on the question . In First Nat. Bank v. Northwestern Nat.
Bank, (1894) 152 Ill. 296, the court held the law merchant still pre-
vailed and knowledge on the acceptor's part was consequently -nec-
essary. New York, on the other hand, in. the case of Trust Com-
pany of America v. Hamilton Bank, (i9o8) 112 N. Y. S. 84, came
to the opposite conclusion." The last three cases were very ably
discussed by Professor Louis M. Greeley in his excellent article
in 3 IILINois LAw REVNXW 331. The writer agrees with the conclu-
sion reached, that the Illinois position, retaining the law merchant
view, is the better where the swindler forges the name of the draw-
er, because in that event, the acceptor can not recover from the
person whose name~is forged as drawer, and, as between the de-
frauded acceptor and the innocent holder, the ultimate loss ought to
fall, as stated by Professor Greeley, "upon the party who could most
easily detect the forgery, that is, the party taking immediately un-
der the forged indorsement." In the present state of the authori-
ties it would be presumptuous to say what view will. eventually pre-
vail, whether knowledge on the acceptor's part will always be es-
sential before he can be charged, or whether such knowledge is
5Minet v. Gibson (1791), z H. BL s6p; Bennett v. Farnell (8o7), 2 Camp. 18o c;
MCCal V. Cornfng (z848), 3 l.a. Ann. 409, 48 Am. Dec. 454.
"DaAtix, NzGoTIAsDz IzrsmutizTs (a ed.), 137, accepts this argument and cites
two American cases, to-wit: Andersro v. Dundee State Bank (893), 66 Hun 613, 21
N. Y. S. 92S. This case is at most only a dictum as the suit was against the drawer, the
drawee not having accepted. The other case is Meridian Nat. Bank of Isd3iaaspo is v.
First Nat. Bank of Shelbyville (1893). 7 Ind. A. 322, S3 Am. St. Rep. 450. Neither
is this case exactly in point. Here M. sold stolen cattle to S. G. & Co. and when asked
for his name said 11W. C. Smith.'-' S. G. & Co. thereupon drew a check to the order of
W. C. Smith, and delivered it to X who had the defendant, drawee bank, certify it, and
later cashed it at the plaintiff bank after indorsing the name W. C. Smith. Held, de*
fendant is liable as the check was received by the identical person to whom its drawer in-
tended to deliver it, and was by him indorsed in the name in which it was issued to
him, and he, as was intended by the drawer, received the benefit of it.
4Cf. United State: v. Chare Nat. Bank (917), 241 Fed. 535.
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wholly immaterial, or only to be required where the drawers name
has been forged.
IV. Is the indorsement of the name of the fictitious payee nec-
essary under the Negotiable Instruments Law? Under the law
merchant, it is said, most courts required such an indorsement, and it
is a fact that generally where the holder recovered, an indorsement
appeared on the instrument; but it seems rather to have been a
circumstance, very important in determining whether the holder
took in ignorance of the real facts, than a requirement of the
rule itself. New York and a few jurisdictions maintained that no
indorsement was necessary 4 7  Professors Ames and McKeehan
and Judge Brewster all take the position that an indorsement is no
longer necessary. The point has not been stressed in the decisions
since the adoption of the Act, but seems to be assumed, since the
section involved does not expressly require it, and a genuine in-
dorsement could under the very circumstances never be proved.4 s
But it is no doubt true, as Professor McKeehan points out, that the
change, if indeed it is one, is not so very important, as no bona fide
purchaser would be likely to take such an instrument, unless the
payee's name had first been indorsed thereon.
In conclusion, then, it might be urged that should the occasion
present itself, section 9 (3) of the Negotiable Instruments Law
ought to be amended so as to avoid the uncertainties that now exist
in that section. Professors Ames and McKeehan have suggested
that the amendment read as follows:
"When the drawer or maker knowingly makes the instru-
ment payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing
payee, or a living person not intended to have any interest init.1,,0
This is substantially the present provision of the Illinois Act, and
is an improvemLnt on the Commissioners Draft in that it answers
the second question herein discussed, and may perhaps be said to
reach the right result in question three, but it leaves some doubt
on that point and does not touch on the other two at all. It would
t
Irving go. Bank v. Alley (188o), 79 N. Y. 536; Rogers v. Ware (1873), 2 Neb.
29, semble; Kohn V. Watkins (882), 2o Kan. 69r. 40 Am. Rep. 336, 338; Dana v. Un-
derwood (1837), x9 Pick. (Mass.) 99, r04; Ci. Security Bank of Faribault v. Lucas
(1897) 69 Minn. 46. semble.
BRANNANA THE NErOTIABIX INsT au mTs LAW AxNOTATED (2 ed.). p. 229;
Boles v. Harding (19o9), 201 Mass. 103, semble.
49BRANNAN, THE NEGOTIABLE IxsTRUMENTS LAw ANNOTATED (2 ed.), p. 233.
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seem that the desideratum might, therefore, be secured by adding
to the Ames-McKeehan amendment the following:
whether the payee's name be indorsed or not; provided the
party relying on the instrument as payable to bearer takes
for value and in ignorance of the fictitious character of the
payee; but knowledge on the part of the acceptor shall not
be necessary in order to charge him, except where the Araw-
er's name is forged.
VICTOR H. KULP.
Univerity of Oklahoma Law School.
